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STATE REGULATION OF SUBSTANDARD
HOUSING AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
TAKING CLAUSE: DEVINES v. MAIER
Courts have long struggled to define the scope of the Constitution's
fifth amendment "taking" clause.' A typical taking occurs when a
state uses its power of eminent domain to physically appropriate pri-
vate property for public use.2 Courts have extended the application of
the taking clause to include state regulation3 that does not result in the
1. The fifth amendment taking clause states in part: "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth
amendment taking clause conditions the government's power of eminent domain. The
clause requires the government exercising its taking powers to pay compensation to the
injured property owner. See Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) (judiciary
has authority to force state to pay compensation in accordance with taking clause). The
Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the taking clause is to prevent the govern-
ment from burdening a few individuals with costs, which in all fairness, the public
should bear. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (Court ruled that it is
fair to require the federal government to pay compensation to merchants who held liens
on vessels to which the government took title). The taking clause applies to state exer-
cises of eminent domain through the fourteenth amendment. See infra note 2.
The Supreme Court first expressed its views on the taking issue in Pumpelly v. Green
Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871). In Pumpelly, the Court held that the state took
property when construction of a public dam led to flooding of the claimant's land. The
Court required an actual physical invasion in its definition of a taking. Id. at 181.
2. The Supreme Court's ruling in Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
226 (1897), applied the taking clause to states through the fourteenth amendment. Mu-
nicipalities' eminent domain powers also are restrained by the taking clause because
municipalities are political subdivisions of states. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City
of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 555 (1914) (courts must treat municipal ordinances as legis-
lation enacted under the state's lawmaking power).
3. States enact the regulations at issue in taking claims pursuant to their police
power. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922) (state
statute restricting mining that caused subsidence of surface dwellings). See infra notes
25-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mahon. Using its police power, a state
may restrict private property uses to protect public health, safety and welfare. See, e.g.,
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a zoning ordi-
nance forbidding industry in a residential area as a valid exercise of the police power).
See generally 1 P. NIcHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 99 (1917) (discusses the
types of regulation that are an appropriate exercise of the police power); Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) (review of regulations that courts have
considered takings); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. &
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actual physical invasion of property, but interferes with a property
owner's rights to such an extent that the court considers the regulation
a taking.4 One of the property rights that courts have considered to be
deserving of fifth amendment protection is a tenant's leasehold inter-
est.5 In Devines v. Maier,6 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, however, held that the City of Milwaukee did not "take" a
tenant's leasehold rights by ordering the tenant to temporarily vacate
an uninhabitable dwelling.
The City of Milwaukee, acting pursuant to its housing code,7 or-
dered a tenant to temporarily vacate her apartment.8 The tenant
claimed, inter alia, that the fifth amendment taking clause required the
city to provide compensation before it could order her from her home.'
LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980) (reviewing judicial approaches used to decide which regula-
tions are considered takings).
4. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Justice
Holmes, writing for the Court, provided little guidance to help future courts determine
when a regulation is sufficiently intrusive for the court to consider it a taking. See infra.
note 33 and accompanying text.
5. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946) (Court ordered federal
government to pay compensation to tenants for the public use of tenants' building).
6. 728 F.2d 876 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 130 (1984).
7. MILWAUKEE, WIs., MILWAUKEE CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-4 (1981). See
Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138, 143 (7th Cir. 1981). See also Wis. STAT. § 66.05
(1981). The ordinance authorizes the city to evict residents of a building that is "so old,
dilapidated or... out of repair as to be dangerous, unsafe, unsanitary or otherwise unfit
for human habitation." Id. at § 66.05(l)(a).
In response to blighted conditions that were contributing "to the development of, or
increase in, disease, infant mortality, crime and juvenile delinquency," the City of Mil-
waukee enacted a housing code. MILWAUKEE, WIS., MILWAUKEE CODE OF ORDI-
NANCES Ch. 51 (1981). See 665 F.2d at 145 n.3. These blighted conditions are
"dangerous to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people."
Wis. STAT. § 66.05(1)(a) (1981).
8. Devines v. Maier, 494 F. Supp. 992, 993 (E.D. Wis. 1980). From 1975 to 1978,
the city ordered approximately 400 tenants to vacate their premises, almost all because
of state and municipal housing code violations. See Brief for Appellants at 7, Devines v.
Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981). If a building's owner can bring the buiding up to
code standards, the city may avoid destroying it by ordering the owner to make the
necessary repairs. Wis. STAT. § 66.05(l)(a) (1981).
9. 494 F. Supp. at 994. The district court rejected tenant's taking claim, but con-
ceded that courts may recognize regulations depriving a property owner of his rights as
takings. Id. at 995. Nevertheless, the court asserted that the state does not take a
property owner's rights when it regulates to promote public health and safety, even if
the regulation destroys property rights. Id. The court relied on Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887). See infra notes 15-24 and accompanying text for discussion of Mugler.
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The court of appeals, facing the issue for a second time,1 0 rejected the
tenant's taking argument and entered judgment for the city."1
The Supreme Court first interpreted the fifth amendment taking
clause in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. 2 In Pumpelly, the Court held
that the state took a property owner's land when a public dam flooded
neighboring property.' 3 Thus, the Pumpelly Court defined a "taking"
as involving an actual physical invasion of private property.' 4
Eighteen years after Pumpelly, Justice Harlan, writing for the Court
The Mugler Court indicated that it is undesirable to burden a state's power to protect its
inhabitants' safety with a compensation requirement. 123 U.S. at 669.
The district court pointed out that courts have never required the state to pay com-
pensation to the owner of a dilapidated building for the costs of repair or destruction.
494 F. Supp. at 995.
On appeal, the tenant argued that the Supreme Court defined a regulatory taking in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) and Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Brief for Appellants at 18, Devines v. Maier, 665
F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981). Appellant claimed that under Mahon and Penn Central she is
entitled to compensation if the state regulation completely destroys the value of her
leasehold rights. Id. Appellant also asserted that she is entitled to compensation be-
cause the purpose of the taking clause is to prevent the state from unfairly burdening
individuals with costs that the public should absorb. Id. at 20. See supra note 1.
The Devines I court agreed with both of appellant's arguments, and remanded the
case to determine the amount of compensation that the state must pay. 665 F.2d at 146.
The court emphasized the city's destruction of appellant's leasehold rights. Id. at 142.
The court observed that because the public benefits from the housing code regulations,
it is only fair to require the public to bear the cost of enforcing the housing code. Id. at
146.
10. See infra note 11.
11. 728 F.2d at 887. In Devines II, the court decided two issues. The tenant dis-
agreed with the district court's method of computing the amount of compensation that
the city must pay, while the city argued that because of language in two recent Supreme
Court decisions, Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982), and Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the court should reconsider its
decision in Devines I granting the tenant's taking claim. Id. at 879.
In reversing its own Devines I decision, the Seventh Circuit stated that the "law of the
case" doctrine, under which issues that a court decides on appeal become law on any
subsequent appeal, is not a compelling limitation. Id. at 880. The court noted that it is
not restrained by the law of the case doctrine if its previous decision is "clearly errone-
ous ... and works a manifest injustice in the particular case." Id. (quoting Luminous
Unit Co. v. Freeman-Sweet, Co., 3 F.2d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 1924)).
12. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871). See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & G.
BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 114-18 (1973) (tracing the history of the Supreme Court's
taking clause decisions) [hereinafter cited as F. BOSSELMAN].
13. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 181.
14. See F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 12, at 116.
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in Mugler v. Kansas,15 distinguished police power regulations from em-
inent domain actions." In Mugler, the Court rejected a brewer's claim
that the state "took" his brewery by enacting a statute that prohibited
the manufacture and sale of liquor.17 Justice Harlan defined police
power regulations as restrictions on the use of property that the state
enacts to promote public health, safety or morals.'" According to Jus-
tice Harlan, the state does more than restrict the use of property in
eminent domain actions. The state actually takes title and possession
of the property."' In an eminent domain action, then, the state acts
more like an entrepreneur than a protector of public welfare.20
Justice Harlan's police power regulation-eminent domain distinction
sometimes is referred to as the "separate powers approach"'" because a
court deciding a taking claim will first determine whether the state ex-
ercised its police or eminent domain power. Under this approach, a
court will not consider a police power regulation a taking even if the
regulation restricts a property owner's rights, because there is no actual
physical appropriation of the property.22 Because the state has not
taken property when it enacts a police power regulation, the state is not
required to pay compensation.23 In contrast, the state must always pay
15. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
16. Id. at 668-69. See also Comment, Inverse Condemnation and the Alchemist's
Lesson: You Can't Turn Regulations Into Gold, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 171 (1981)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's expanded application of the taking clause to state regu-
lation).
A state's eminent domain power is premised on the state's right to exercise dominion
over all property within its boundaries. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 470 (5th ed.
1979). The constitutional source of the eminent domain power is the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. See also supra note 2. Most state constitutions also have provi-
sions authorizing eminent domain. See D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 15 (1982).
17. 123 U.S. at 668. The Mugler Court upheld the statute as a valid police power
regulation based upon the statute's substantial relation to public health, safety and wel-
fare. Id. at 661.
18. Id. at 659.
19. Id. at 668-69.
20. See Sax, Takings, supra note 3, at 39.
21. Comment, supra note 16, at 174.
22. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 16, at 16.
23. 123 U.S. at 668. Justice Harlan reasoned that burdening the state's police
power with a compensation requirement would deter the state from regulating to pro-
mote public health, safety and morals. Id. at 669. A property owner may only chal-
lenge a police power regulation for its constitutionality. If the challenge succeeds, the
court strikes down the regulation, but it does not require the state to pay compensation.
Id. at 661.
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compensation for an eminent domain action.24
The Court expanded Justice Harlan's narrow interpretation of the
taking clause in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.2 5 The decision was
to have a profound impact on the direction of taking law.2 6 In Mahon,
the holder of mining rights challenged a state statute which restricted
mining that caused subsidence of surface dwellings.2 Justice Holmes,
writing for the Court, rejected Justice Harlan's separate powers analy-
sis.28 According to Justice Holmes, if state regulation "goes too far"
the Court will consider it a taking.29 Justice Holmes contended that
police power regulations differ from eminent domain actions only in
degree.3 ° Justice Holmes' approach sets up a continuum, with police
power regulations at one end and eminent domain actions at the
other.3 ' Under the "continuum approach," 32 the police power regula-
tion at some point "goes too far" and becomes a taking, thereby requir-
ing the state to pay compensation.3 3
Justice Holmes asserted that courts should use a balancing test to
decide whether a regulation is a taking.34 A court should weigh the
public benefit from the regulation against the property owner's in-
24. See, e.g., Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380 (1895) (if the state appropriates property
it must pay compensation, even though the appropriation serves the public welfare).
25. 209 U.S. 393 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
26. See Sax, Takings, supra note 3, at 39-40.
27. 260 U.S. at 412-13.
28. Id. at 415.
29. Id. The Court held unconstitutional as a police power regulation the state's
attempt to restrict mining. Id. at 414. Justice Holmes contended that the state at-
tempted to circumvent the taking clause's compensation requirement by labelling the
statute a police power regulation. See id. at 413.
30. Id. at 416. Relying on Mugler, Justice Brandeis dissented. Id. Justice Brandeis
argued that the statute was a valid exercise of the state's police power because it pro-
tected public health and safety. Id. at 422. Adopting the separate powers approach
advocated by Justice Harlan in Mugler, Justice Brandeis maintained that the state is not
obligated to compensate property owners for losses resulting from police power regula-
tions. Id. at 417.
31. See Gordon, Compensable Regulatory Taking: A Tollbooth Rises on Regulation
Road, 12 REAL EsT. L.J. 211, 213-14 (1984) (analyzes the history and present status of
the continuum approach).
32. Id. at 214.
33. In Mahon, Justice Holmes provided little guidance to aid courts in determining
where to draw the line between police power regulations and eminent domain actions.
Justice Holmes stated that deciding when a regulation becomes a taking depends on the
facts of each case. 260 U.S. at 416.
34. Id. at 415-16.
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jury.35 In Mahon, Justice Holmes applied a "diminution in value"
test 36 to measure the property owner's injury.37 If the public need out-
weighs the property owner's injury,38 the court will uphold the regula-
tion without requiring the state to pay compensation.39
Justice Holmes' continuum theory remains the predominant ap-
proach courts use to decide taking cases.' In determining whether a
regulation should be considered a taking, however, courts have often
used criteria other than the diminution in value test that Justice
Holmes advocated.41 For example, some courts focus on the character
35. Id. See also D. MANDELKER, supra note 16, at 22.
36. 260 U.S. at 413. A court using the diminution in value test compares the value
of the owner's property before and after regulation. Id. If the difference is large
enough, the state must pay compensation for what the court recognizes as a taking. See
D. MANDELKER, supra note 16, at 21.
37. For a discussion of the benefits and shortcomings of the diminution in value
test, see Sax, supra note 3, at 50.
38. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (Court used a balancing
test to uphold a zoning ordinance that limited land uses to single family residence and
open-space).
39. See F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 12, at 126, 138. See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
Courts, however, have not universally accepted Justice Holmes' approach. Six years
after Mahon, the Supreme Court used Justice Harlan's separate powers approach to
reject a taking claim. In Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), the Court upheld a
regulation ordering the destruction of red cedar trees without compensation. The trees
produced a rust that damaged nearby apple orchards. Id. at 280. Justice Stone, writing
for the Court, declared that "where the public interest is involved preferment of that
interest over the property interest of the individual, to the extent even of its destruction,
is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of the police power which
affects property." Id. at 279-80 (emphasis added). Justice Stone's separate powers ap-
proach in Miller is clearly inconsistent with Mahon because, under Miller, as long as the
state's regulation is constitutional under its police power the Court refuses to recognize
the regulation as a taking.
From 1930 to 1962, the Supreme Court left taking cases to the state courts. See F.
BOSSELMAN, supra note 12, at 30-36 (analyzes state court taking decisions). In 1962 the
Court returned to the continuum approach. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962). In Goldblatt the Court upheld an ordinance that prohibited excavation
below the water table. Id. at 598. Although the Court mentioned the separate powers
approach advocated by Justice Harlan in Mugler, the Court clearly stated that a suffi-
ciently intrusive regulation can be a taking. Id. at 594. The Court rejected the property
owner's taking claim because the claimant failed to show sufficient financial injury. Id.
40. See generally Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Eth-
ical Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARM. L. REV. 1165, 1183-1201
(1967) (evaluating the merits of the different tests courts use in terms of how well they
serve the fairness principle underlying the taking clause).
41. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), pro-
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of the state's regulation rather than on the amount of harm caused to
the property owner. If the state's regulation results in a physical inva-
sion of the claimant's property, a court will consider it a taking and
order the state to pay compensation.42 If, on the other hand, the state
is merely regulating a property owner's "noxious use" of his property,
a court is less likely to find a taking.4 3 Another approach concentrates
on the availability of alternative uses for the property after the regula-
tion has been put into effect.' Courts using this approach will not
recognize a state regulation as a taking unless the regulation leaves the
vides a good illustration. There, the Court held that a state statute authorizing a cable
company to attach plates, boxes, wires, bolts and screws to the claimant's building was a
taking. The Court asserted that when a state's regulation results in actual physical
invasion of the property owner's land, a court should apply a per se rule of compensa-
tion. See id. at 421. See also Michelman, supra note 40, at 1184 (noting that courts
always require compensation for a physical invasion). Cf. United States v. Cent. Eureka
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1948) (federal regulation not a taking, regardless of the effect
on claimant's property rights, without actual physical invasion).
42. A noxious use of property is a use threatening public health, safety or welfare.
See Sax supra note 3, at 39. The state's regulation is merely a reaction to a problem the
property owner created.
The states' power to terminate noxious uses without paying compensation is an exten-
sion of the states' traditional power to abate nuisances. See Michelman, supra note 40,
at 1196-1201. State courts first allowed the government to abate nuisances, without
paying compensation, in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 61
Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851) (statute enjoining erection of wharf beyond certain bounda-
ries not considered a taking, but instead is a noncompensable prohibition of a nuisance);
Presbyterian Church v. Mayor of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. 1826) (city did not take
property rights when it prohibited use of land as a cemetery; cemetery was a nuisance
because city officials believed burying the dead produced unhealthy vapors). Accord 1
P. NICHOLS, supra note 3, at § 104 (states' authority to eliminate nuisances without
paying compensation limited to situations where the property right has little value).
Early in the twentieth century courts continued to use the noxious use-nuisance the-
ory to reject taking claims. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding
state statute that authorized destruction of red cedar trees because of the harmful rust
that they produced); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding ordinance
that prohibited brick manufacturing in a residential area because of the smoke
produced).
43. In Penn Central, the city's landmark law prohibited the claimant from building
a high-rise office building on top of Grand Central Station. Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, rejected the claimant's argument that the city took its air rights. Id. at 138.
Justice Brennan contended that the law did not hinder the claimant's "primary" ex-
pected use of the land. Id. at 136. Justice Brennan pointed out that the law provided
the claimant with an adequate remedy - the right to transfer its development rights to
a different area. Id. at 137. Accord Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)
(upholding zoning ordinance because claimants were "free to pursue their reasonable
investment expectations").
44. D. MANDELKER, supra note 16, at 21. See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler
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claimant with no reasonable use of the property.45 Because of the myr-
iad of approaches to the taking issue,46 courts have decided such claims
largely on an ad hoc basis.47
Even though taking cases seldom are decided by applying a general
rule of law, state regulation of substandard housing is one area in
which courts consistently have refused to find a taking.48 Under Jus-
tice Harlan's separate powers approach, a state regulating pursuant to
its housing code does not take property as long as the regulation is a
valid exercise of the state's police power.49 A housing code is a valid
exercise of the police power if it is "substantially related" to public
health, safety or welfare.50 Under Justice Holmes' continuum ap-
proach, housing code enforcement is not sufficiently intrusive to consti-
tute a taking.51 Thus, regardless of whether a court uses the separate
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding zoning ordinance that restricted land to
residential use, even though the ordinance caused 75% diminution in value).
45. One author remarked that, "[these tests are rather like a blind person's attempt
to describe an elephant; they are insufficient because no one test is definitive in all fac-
tual situations." Comment, Inverse Condemnation, supra note 16, at 176.
46. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (1978).
47. See, eg., Miles v. District of Columbia, 510 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (munici-
pality may use police power to destroy, without paying compensation, a building that is
a threat to public safety or health); Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir.
1974) (upholding a city ordinance authorizing destruction without paying compensation
of unrepaired nuisances); Baker v. Mueller, 222 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1955) (municipality
may use police power to destroy, without compensation, buildings that are a nuisance or
are dangerous to public safety); Jackson v. Davis, 530 F. Supp. 2 (E.D. Tenn. 1981)
(city's condemnation of a building that violates electrical wiring regulations not consid-
ered a taking); Housemaster Corp. v. City of Kenner, 374 So. 2d 1240 (Sup. Ct. La.
1979) (city may destroy dilapidated apartments without paying compensation because
apartments threatened public safety); City of Paterson v. Fargo Realty Inc., 415 A.2d
1210 (N.J. Dist. 1980) (city may destroy, without paying compensation, fire damaged
building that threatens public safety); Cf. Blume v. City of Deland, 358 F.2d 698 (5th
Cir. 1966) (city may destroy unsafe building and place a lien on building for cost of
demolition); Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953) (city
may condemn slum housing without paying compensation). Contra Yonkers Commu-
nity Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1975) (city taking public
property pursuant to urban redevelopment plan must pay compensation).
48. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
49. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
50. See supra note 47.
51. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the
Court stated in dictum the following:
States have broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the land-
lord-tenant relationship in particular without paying compensation to all economic
injuries that such regulation entails ... our holding today in no way alters the
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powers or the continuum approach, a court will not consider a state's
regulation pursuant to its housing code a taking.5 2
Recently, the Supreme Court, in Texaco, Inc. v. Short,5 3 relied on a
novel approach to reject a property owner's taking claim. 54 In Texaco,
a holder of mineral rights challenged the constitutionality of a state
statute" that divested him of his mineral rights.5 6 The statute requires
a holder of mineral interests to either use the interest5 7 or file a state-
ment of claim within twenty years of acquisition of the right. 8 If the
holder of the mineral rights fails to use them, and neglects to file a
statement of claim, the rights revert to the current owner of the prop-
erty's surface. 9 In ruling on the statute's constitutionality, the Court
first noted that it is the state, not the Constitution,60 that creates all
property rights, including mineral rights.6 1 The Court next stated that
because it is the states that create property rights, it is constitutional
for a state to place reasonable conditions on the retention of such
rights.62 If a property owner fails to satisfy the requirements that a
state places on the retention of a right, then the property owner loses
analysis governing the State's power to require landlords to comply with building
codes.
Id. at 440. For a discussion of Loretto, see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
52. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
53. See id. at 530.
54. The statute is the Dormant Mineral Interests Act, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-5-11-
I to 32-5-11-8 (Burns 1980).
55. 454 U.S. at 518.
56. The Act defines the "use" of a mineral interest as the production or attempted
production of minerals, or the payment of rent, royalties or taxes for the interest. IND.
CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-3 (Burns 1980).
57. Id. at 32-5-11-1.
58. Id.
59. 454 U.S. at 525. The Court cited Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
(holding that under state law an untenured professor has no property interest and thus
is not entitled to a hearing).
60. The Court noted that Indiana state law creates mineral interests. 454 U.S. at
525-26. See also IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-1 1-2 (Burns 1980).
61. 454 U.S. at 526. The Court made a similar argument in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134 (1974). In Arnett, a civil service employee claimed that he had a constitutional
right to a hearing before the federal government could discharge him. The Court held
that the same statute that the claimant argued provided a property right also limited the
right by denying the opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 153-54. The Court concluded
that the claimant must "take the bitter with the sweet." Id. at 154.
62. 454 U.S. at 529.
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his right.63
Applying this reasoning to the facts in Texaco, the Court concluded
that because the claimant did not use his mineral interest or file a state-
ment of claim as the statute required, his mineral rights lapsed.' The
Court asserted that the claimant's neglect resulted in the complete di-
vestment of his mineral rights and thus he possessed no rights for the
state to take.65 The Court emphasized that the claimant's disregard for
the statutory requirements caused the lapse of the right, rather than
any state conduct.
6 6
In Devines v. Maier,67 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, re-
sponding to the Supreme Court's Texaco 68 opinion, reversed its prior
decision 69 (Devines 1) by finding that the City of Milwaukee did not
take a tenant's leasehold rights when it ordered her to temporarily va-
cate her uninhabitable dwelling.70 The Devines I court, using a contin-
uum approach 7' and employing the "diminution in value" test,7
2
considered the city's enforcement of its housing code a taking.73 Fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's Texaco opinion, the court of appeals al-
tered its analysis of Devines, and rejected the tenant's claim that the
city's regulation constituted a taking.74
63. Id. at 526. The Court pointed out that the Indiana statute is similar to state
recording acts and statutes of limitation. In each case the property owner's rights lapse
because he fails to fulfill statutory requirements. Id. at 526-29.
64. Id. The Court noted that the statutory provision requiring the filing of a state-
ment of claim is not itself a taking. Id.
65. Id. The Court stated that "this Court has never required the State to compen-
sate the owner for the consequences of his own neglect." Id.
66. 728 F.2d 876 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 130 (1984).
67. 454 U.S. 516 (1982). See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Texaco.
68. 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981).
69. 728 F.2d at 886.
70. 665 F.2d at 141. The court, citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922), stated that its resolution of the taking claim depends on the extent that the
state's regulation interferes with the private property right. Id. See supra notes 25-39
and accompanying text for a discussion of Mahon and the continuum theory.
71. 665 F.2d at 142, 144. The court found that the city's enforcement of its housing
code completely destroyed claimant's leasehold rights by extinguishing his right to oc-
cupy the premises. See supra note 36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
diminution in value test.
72. Id. at 146.
73. 728 F.2d at 886.
74. See Brief for Appellant at 19-24, Devines v. Maier, 728 F.2d 876. See supra
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The Mayor of Milwaukee argued that the city's enforcement of its
housing code was indistinguishable, in principle, from the operation of
the state mineral rights statute in Texaco." The court compared the
facts of the two cases and concluded that in each case the state's regu-
lation consisted of three steps. First, in both cases the state created a
property right.76 The state created mineral rights in Texaco" and
leasehold rights in Devines." Second, the state, exercising its police
power, placed a reasonable condition on the property right.79 In Tex-
aco, the state required the property owner to either use his mineral
rights or file a statement of claim. ° In Devines, the state required the
property owner to maintain his premises in a habitable condition."1 Fi-
nally, in both cases the state extinguished the property right when the
property owner failed to satisfy the requisite condition. 2
The Devines court, after acknowledging the similarity between the
facts of the two cases, considered the Texaco Court's reasoning.8 3 The
court noted that in Texaco the lapse of the property owner's mineral
rights occurred through "no fault of the State."8 4 The court next eval-
uated, in terms of fault, the sequence of events leading to the city's
order to vacate.85 The court observed that the city, by enacting and
enforcing its housing code, protected both the tenant and the public
from a potentially hazardous condition. 6 Under the housing code
both landlords and tenants are obligated to make repairs that are nec-
notes 55-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the mineral rights statute in
Texaco.
75. See 728 F.2d at 882.
76. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
77. The State of Wisconsin creates a property right by providing tenants with the
right to the exclusive possession of their leased premises. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.05(2)
(West 1981).
78. See 728 F.2d at 882.
79. 454 U.S. at 518.
80. Wis. STAT. § 66.05(1) (a) (1981). See supra note 7.
81. See 728 F.2d at 882.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 884.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 886.
86. See id. at 884 n.8. Tenants must maintain the plumbing, electrical wiring, ma-
chinery, and furnished equipment unless the cost of repair approaches the amount of
rent that the tenant pays. Tenants must also repair damage caused by their negligence.
Landlords are responsible for all other necessary repairs. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07
(West 1981). A municipal ordinance imposes an additional obligation on tenants. Ten-
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essary to keep the premises in a condition fit for human habitation. 7
Thus, the court reasoned, it is either the landlord's neglect or the ten-
ant's neglect that makes the dwelling uninhabitable. 8
The Devines court concluded that its denial of the tenant's taking
claim was completely supported by the Texaco decision.89 In each case
the state created a property right, but limited the scope of the right by
placing a reasonable condition on retention of the right.' The prop-
erty owner lost his right in each case when he failed to meet the statu-
tory requirements that the state placed on the right.91 In both cases
the property owner's uncompensated loss occurred as a direct result of
his own neglect.92
The tenant attempted to distinguish Devines from Texaco by arguing
that the statutes operate differently to divest property owners of their
rights.9" The tenant observed that the mineral rights statute in Texaco
is self-executing; if the mineral rights holder does not use his interest,
or file a statement of claim, his rights automatically lapse.94 In con-
trast, Milwaukee's housing code is not self-executing 95 because a build-
ing inspector must declare a dwelling "uninhabitable." 96 The tenant
contended that because housing code enforcement requires a discre-
tionary administrative decision, the city provides property owners with
less notice of when and under what conditions they will lose their
rights than did the state in Texaco.97
The court, noting that the building inspector's decision is not final,98
ants must maintain their premises in a "clean and sanitary condition." MILWAUKEE,
WIS., MILWAUKEE CODE OF ORDINANCES § 51-81 (1981).
87. See 728 F.2d at 884.
88. Id. at 885. In further support of its rejection of the tenant's taking claim, the
court cited language from Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982). See supra note 51 for the relevant language in Loretto.
89. See 728 F.2d at 884.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Brief for Appellees at 7-9, Devines v. Maier, 728 F.2d 876.
93. See id. at 7.
94. Id. at 8.
95. 728 F.2d at 885.
96. See Brief for Appellees at 9, Devines v. Maier, 728 F.2d 876.
97. See 728 F.2d at 885.
98. Id.
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dismissed the tenant's distinctions as insignificant.99 A municipal ordi-
nance provides tenants with the right to a hearing and the right to
appeal the results of the hearing." ° Additionally, tenants can appeal
to the state courts for a restraining order, and a judicial determination
of the reasonableness of the city's order. 0 1 Because in both Texaco
and Devines the property owner had a right to judicial review before he
lost his property right,10 2 the court concluded that the two cases were
sufficiently similar to warrant the same outcome.
Devines v. Maier is important for its application of the Supreme
Court's taking claim analysis in Texaco to a tenant's taking argu-
ment. 103 Following the Texaco decision, the Devines court rejected the
tenant's taking claim by focusing on how the state narrowly defines
leasehold rights."°' Recognizing that the state conditioned the tenant's
leasehold rights on his ability to maintain the premises in a habitable
state, the court avoided facing the taking claim.10 5 Because the tenant
neglected to satisfy the state-imposed condition, he lost his property
right, and therefore possessed no property right that the state could
take by its order to vacate the premises.1
The Seventh Circuit's application of Texaco to the regulation of a
tenant's leasehold rights warrants criticism. In Texaco, the property
owner clearly failed to satisfy the statutory requirements, thereby caus-
ing the lapse of his rights. 0 7 In the Devines case, however, the housing
code imposes duties on both landlords and tenants.'08 A landlord's
neglect may cause a faultless tenant to lose his leasehold rights."°9
Devines v. Maier also deserves criticism for its failure to reject the
tenant's taking claim by applying a conventional approach to the tak-
99. Id. See MILWAUKEE, WIS., MILWAUKEE CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-11(3),
(5) (1981).
100. 728 F.2d at 885. See WIs. STAT. § 66.05(3) (1981).
101. 728 F.2d at 885.
102. In Texaco, the Supreme Court did not indicate whether its taking analysis
should be extended by courts to other areas of state regulation. See 454 U.S. at 530.
103. See supra notes 67-102 and accompanying text.
104. See 728 F.2d at 884.
105. See id.
106. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 86.
109. The Devines court recognized that it might be the landlord's neglect that
caused the dwelling to become uninhabitable. 728 F.2d at 886. The court, however,
seemed to find the landlord-tenant distinction irrelevant. See id.
1985]
Washington University Open Scholarship
276 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 29:263
ing argument. Courts using either a continuum or separate powers ap-
proach have never held state enforcement of its housing code to be a
taking." 0 By ordering the tenant to vacate her uninhabitable dwelling,
the city simply exercised its police power to protect the public from an
unhealthy and potentially dangerous situation."' The city did not
physically invade, acquire an interest in, or use the property in any way
that would lead a court applying a traditional approach to consider the
city's regulation a taking. 112
Devines v. Maier is significant because it applies Texaco's atypical
approach to the different and important subject of state regulation of
substandard housing. In the future, courts dealing with taking claims
in the context of substandard housing may follow the Devines lead and
employ the Texaco analysis. Additionally, courts may attempt to ex-
pand Texaco, as the Devines court did, to decide taking claims in areas
other than the regulation of substandard housing or mineral rights.
Steven R. Selsberg
110. 494 F. Supp. at 995. See supra note 47 (cases where court denied claimants
compensation for state regulation of sub-code housing).
111. 728 F.2d at 886. See also supra note 7.
112. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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